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In 1973 1 proposed that the exclusionary rule be replaced by a
criminal procedure ombudsman,' an independent government official2
who, with the help of a number of assistants, 3 would investigate in-
stances of alleged police misconduct, publicize the results of such investi-
gations, and authorize the appointment of private counsel at public
expense to sue the offending official or officials when the ombudsman
found probable cause to believe that an aggrieved person had been sub-
jected to a deprivation of constitutional rights or other rights set forth in
* Professor, George Mason University School of Law. J.S.D., Columbia University,
1982; LL.M., Harvard University, 1969; J.D., University of Michigan, 1962; A.B., Dartmouth
College, 1959.
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I Davidow, CriminalProcedure Ombudsman as a Substiluteforthe Exc/usionay Rule. A Proposal, 4
TEX. TECH L. REv. 317 (1973). The original, 1973 proposal is set forth izfna in the Appendix,
together with the modifications suggested by the current Article.
2 "The Ombudsman is an independent governmental official who receives complaints,
conducts investigations, and makes recommendations relating to the actions of other govern-
mental agencies. He succeeds mainly through persuasion, which is made more effective by
the publicity which he can give to his recommendations." Id. at 322.
One of the best general treatments of the ombudsman is found in W. GELLHORN,
OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS (1967). The extent to which the ombudsman principle has been
adopted at various levels of government in the United States is outlined in Haemmel, The
Ombudsman, Or Ciiizens'Defender- The North Carolina Experience, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 227, 245-
246 (1979). At least five states have adopted the Ombudsman at the state level. ALASKA
STAT. §§ 24.55.010-.340 (1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 96-1 to -19 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 601G.1-.23 (West 1975 and West Supp. 1981-82); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,241 to 8,254
(1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27E-3 to -41 (West Supp. 1981-82). The term "ombudsman" is
used in the Alaska, Hawaii, and Iowa statutes. The Iowa statute also uses the term "citizens'
aide"; in Nebraska the official is referred to as the "public counsel"; in New Jersey the
ombudsman is referred to as the "Office of Citizen Complaints" of the Department of the
Public Advocate.
3 The proposed bill provided for the appointment of not more than 100 assistant
ombudsmen. My assumption was that the ombudsmen and assistants would enforce the Bill
of Rights and other legal restrictions with respect to both state and federal official actions.
Davidow, supra note 1, at 328, 336.
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statutes or regulations.4 The proposal also would have made recovery
against the government possible in cases in which the fact finder was
satisfied that a violation had occurred but in which the offending officer
could not be identified or had acted in good faith.5 Since the publica-
tion of this proposal, the debate over the exclusionary rule has continued
unabated, 6 but no further legislation, either state or federal, has been
enacted to replace the rule. Some legislation, however, has been intro-
duced in Congress, 7 and hearings have been held.8 The United States
Supreme Court has refused to expand the rule,9 and, in the fourth
amendment area, has made federal review of state court decisions less
likely by severely restricting the opportunities for federal habeas corpus
relief. 10
Thus, the problems associated with the exclusionary rule remain:
the possible failure to deter police lawlessness, the release of some guilty
persons, and the failure to provide a remedy for the innocent." Al-
4 Appointment of private counsel at government expense was regarded as extremely im-
portant since, in the absence of such provisions, aggrieved persons "might not have the ability
to present their claims without the assistance of counsel, whose fees might exceed the ag-
grieved person's financial resources." Id. at 320.
The ombudsman was given the power to act with respect to any law violation, defined as
any departure from pertinent constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions. I accepted
the thesis of the late Lon Fuller that it is extremely important to require adherence by the
government to its own rules and regulations. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 81, 209
(rev. ed. 1969); Davidow, supra note 1, at 338.
5 Davidow, supra note 1, at 329, 339.
6 Among the recent discussions of the exclusionary rule are the following: COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE U.S., IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS (1979); 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3-39 (1978); S. SCHLESINGER,
EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE (1977); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionav' Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural"
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978); Sunderland, Liberals, Conserva-
tives, and the Exclusionag Rule, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 343 (1980).
7 S. 101, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); S. 751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Amend. No. 93
to S. 951, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1995, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1981). All but S. 951
are reproduced in The Exclusionag Rule Bills.- Hearings on S 101, S 751, and S. 1995 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciag, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 531,
533, 563 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The first, third, and fourth of these bills would
limit the circumstances under which evidence secured in violation of the fourth amendment
would be inadmissible. The second bill would abolish the exclusionary rule. The second,
third, and fourth bills would permit a tort action against the federal government for violation
of fourth amendment rights (but with severe limitations on the amount of damages that could
be collected). The second and third bills would authorize disciplinary action against a police
officer. See infra notes 32 & 72.
8 Hearings were held on October 5 and November 12, 1981, and on March 16 and 25,
1982, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Hear-
ings, supra note 7.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974).
10 See Engle v. Issac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
I 1 Other problems associated with the exclusionary rule are discussed infra note 32.
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though the extent of these problems is disputed, 12 one may conclude not
merely that each of these deficiencies of the rule continues in some meas-
ure, but also that the public probably perceives that these deficiencies
exist.' 3 Apart from any other consideration, this public perception must
be dealt with. It seems appropriate, therefore, to reconsider the remedy
that I suggested in 1973 in light of pertinent recent developments. Is the
basic approach still sound? What adjustments should be made in the
light of recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court?
II. THE SOUNDNESS OF THE BASIC APPROACH
My premise was that a criminal procedure ombudsman would be
an effective method by which to enforce the fourth, fifth, sixth,' 4 and, in
the case of the states, fourteenth amendment limitations on police prac-
tices. Concerning the fifth amendment, the assumption was that the
criminal procedure ombudsman would be an effective alternative to the
exclusion of statements which are taken in violation of the present Mi-
randa standards but nevertheless thought to be trustworthy. I assumed
that untrustworthy statements, such as those which were the result of
coercion or promises of leniency, would continue to be inadmissible. I
contrasted the proposed ombudsman with the present exclusionary rule
which, on the basis of earlier studies, I assumed to be lacking in suffi-
12 Compare, e.g., Canon, Is the Exc/usionag Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea
Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974) with S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at
50-60.
13 In one relatively recent poll, respondents were asked in part whether they agreed or
disagreed with the following statement: "Violation of law and order has been encouraged by
the courts." Sixty-nine percent expressed agreement; twenty-three percent expressed disa-
greement; eight percent said that they were "not sure." Erskine, The Polls. Causes of Crime, 38
PUB. OPINION Q. 288, 291 (1974). Although respondents could have had in mind factors
other than the exclusionary rule--such as lack of sympathy for the substantive decisions in
the fourth amendment area or assumptions about undue leniency in sentencing-it is cer-
tainly possible that at least some of the criticism of the courts was based on the exclusionary
rule. To the extent that other factors, such as dissatisfaction with the substantive fourth
amendment rules, were involved, this survey result tends to illustrate that Americans have not
been very well educated in fundamental constitutional principles. This in turn suggests the
importance of the Ombudsman, who can properly educate the public. See infia notes 83 & 84
and accompanying text.
14 In the minds of many lawyers the exclusionary rule is probably most closely associ-
ated with the holding in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that physical evidence
seized in violation of the fourth amendment, as made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, must be excluded in a state trial. . . . If, however, the essence
of the exclusionary rule is the exclusion of evidence, otherwise trustworthy, because of a
violation of an individual's constitutional rights, then the rule encompasses the exclusion
of confessions secured in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (protec-
tion of fifth amendment right to be free from self-incrimination through the enforcement
of the sixth amendment right to counsel), and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964) (evidence inadmissible if secured through interference with the attorney-client
relationship, as protected by the sixth amendment).
Davidow, supra note 1, at 317 n. 1.
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cient deterrence. 15 Also, of course, I noted the failure of the rule to pro-
tect the clearly innocent, who presumably, would have no occasion to
invoke the exclusionary rule.
A. SATISFACTION OF THE REQUIREMENT OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
Although the deterrence rational for the exclusionary rule is the one
chiefly relied upon by the present majority of the United States
Supreme Court,' 6 a competing rationale, that of judicial integrity, is
championed by Justices Brennan and Marshall.' 7 There are at least two
possible versions of this rationale. The first is that any admission of evi-
dence seized in violation of the Constitution amounts to unacceptable
condonation of the illegality, regardless of whether some other effective
remedy is available to enforce the Constitution. 18 The second version is
premised on the assumption that no effective enforcement mechanism
other than the exclusionary rule is available.'9 If the latter version is the
one adopted by Justices Marshall and Brennan, then my proposal will
satisfy them if, in fact, the proposed remedy proves to be effective. I
reject, however, the former, non-utilitarian version. Insistence upon ad-
herence to the exclusionary rule regardless of the availability of effective
15 E.g., Oaks, Studying the Exc/usionagy Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665
(1970).
16 "The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the
search victim. . . Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police con-
duct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
17 E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan was joined in his dissent by Justices Marshall and Douglas. Only Justices
Brennan and Marshall remain on the Court, however.
18 The exclusionary rule, if not perfect, accomplished the twin goals of enabling the
judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the peo-
ple-all potential victims of unlawful government conduct-that the government would
not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining
popular trust in government.
Id at 357. "For the first time, the Court today discounts to the point of extinction the vital
function of the rule to ensure that the judiciary avoid even the slightest appearance of sanc-
tioning illegal government conduct." Id. at 360.
19 "The exclusionary rule is needed to make the Fourth Amendment something real; a
guarantee that does not carry with it the exclusion of evidence obtained by its violation is a
chimera." Id. at 361. See also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 555 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted):
"It is . . . imperative to have a practical procedure by which courts can review
alleged violations of constitutional rights and articulate the meaning of those rights. The
advantage of the exclusionary rule--entirely apart from any deterrent effect-is that it
provides an occasion for judicial review, and it gives credibility to the constitutional
guarantees. By demonstrating that society will attach serious consequences to the viola-
tion of constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule invokes and magnifies the moral and
educating force of the law. Over the long term this may integrate some fourth amend-
ment ideals into the value system or norms of behavior of law enforcement agencies."
... . While distinguished authority has suggested that an effective affirmative remedy
could equally serve that function, . . . no equal alternative has yet been devised.
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alternatives should be rejected because this insistence will have the effect
of hindering actual enforcement of constitutional restraints while assur-
ing a partial and merely formal compliance.
Doubts still remain about the extent to which the rule deters police
lawlessness, especially in situations in which police are not primarily in-
terested in successful prosecutions (e.g., where the chief goal is harass-
ment of a disliked group).20 Moreover, there is no hope, theoretical or
otherwise, that the exclusionary rule can benefit the innocent victims of
police lawlessness. 2 ' In light of this, to insist upon the retention of the
exclusionary rule is to insist upon maintenance of the status quo-an
absence of an effective device by which to prevent police lawlessness-
since the political reality is that no effective legislative alternative to the
exclusionary rule is likely to be enacted if it is thought that the United
States Supreme Court will nevertheless retain the rule. More effective
restraints upon the police are difficult to enact under the best of circum-
stances;22 certainly, they stand little or no chance of being enacted with-
out a quid pro quo-the abolition of the exclusionary rule.
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
IS A REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS
It has been suggested that the exclusionary rule is a requirement of
due process, since due process requires states (by virtue of the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment) and the federal government
(by virtue of the due process clause of the fifth amendment) to adhere to
the law of the land.2:3 Admission of evidence seized in violation of the
law of the land is viewed as itself a violation of the law of the land. Such
an approach clearly makes utilitarian considerations irrelevant. Surely
a strong historical argument can be made that "due process" should be
read as "the law of the land. 24 It does not follow, however, that the
20 See S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 56.
21 I admit, of course, that to the extent that fewer innocent persons are subjected to un-
lawful conduct by the police because of the existence of the exclusionary rule, innocent per-
sons benefit generally from the exclusionary rule. I refer here, however, to innocent persons
who are in fact the victims of unlawful police conduct; these people are not benefited by the
exclusionary rule. My assumption is, of course, that innocent persons will not be prosecuted;
unfortunately, this presumption is occasionally unwarranted.
22 Opposition on the part of the police, with some public support, to the notion of civilian
review boards illustrates the difficulties that will be encountered in any effort to impose exter-
nal restraints upon the police. See Davidow, supra note 1, at 324-25. This is not to suggest
that civilian control is an impossibility everywhere. See Berger, Law Enforcement Control- Chec's
and Balances For the Police System, 4 CONN. L. REv. 467, 490 (1972).
23 See Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exc/usionag
, 
Rule, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 343,
368-73 (1980).
24 The origin of the Due Process Clause is Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, which
declares that "No free man shall be taken, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed,
nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers
1982]
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enforcement of the "law of the land" should take any particular form.
Although it is possible to read "law of the land" as a requirement that
the states adhere to the "law of the land" during each criminal prosecu-
tion, and to conclude further that the admission of evidence unlawfully
seized is a denial of the personal right to be tried in accordance with due
process, it is also possible to read "law of the land" as a requirement that
each person, including a defendant in a criminal case, be afforded an
efcive remedy for any failure on the part of the state or federal govern-
ment to adhere to the law of the land. This latter interpretation is, of
course, consistent with the creation of a substitute for the exclusionary
rule. 25
C. UNJUSTIFIABLE CONTENTION THAT A CONVICTED PERSON HAS
FORFEITED THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
It has been suggested that if the person who is the subject of an
unreasonable search and seizure is thereafter convicted of a crime on the
basis of evidence discovered during the unlawful search, then that indi-
vidual should not be permitted to sue the policeman because the indi-
vidual's right of privacy has not been invaded; that is, involvement in an
illegal activity has deprived the individual of his or her right of pri-
vacy.2 6 I reject this thesis because it is premised on a misunderstanding
of the Bill of Rights. The fourth amendment does not merely create a
right of privacy; rather, it is part of the larger Bill of Rights, which sets
and by the law ofthe land." (emphasis added) As early as 1354, the words "due process of
law" were used in an English statute interpreting Magna Carta, and by the end of the
14th Century "due process of law" and "law of the land" were interchangeable. Thus
the origin or this clause was an attempt by those who wrote Magna Carta to do away
with the so-called trials of that period where people were liable to sudden arrest and
summary conviction in courts and by judicial commissions with no sure and definite
procedural protections and under laws that might have been improvised to try their
particular cases. Chapter 39 of Magna Carta was a guarantee that the government
would take neither life, liberty, nor property without a trial in accord with the law of the
land that already existed at the time the alleged offense was committed. This means that
the Due Process Clause gives all Americans, whoever they are and wherever they happen
to be, the right to be tried by independent and unprejudiced courts using established
procedures in applying valid pre-existing laws. . . . The due process of law standard for
trial is one in accordance with the Bill of Rights and laws passed pursuant to constitu-
tional power, guaranteeing to all alike a trial under the general law of the land.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169-70 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (footnotes
ommitted).
25 The Supreme Court has required that the federal government adhere to its own regula-
tions, at least in regard to the decision to fire an employee. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535
(1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). Generally, the Supreme Court has not re-
quired the states to adhere to their own statutes and regulations. But see Hicks v. Oklahoma,
447 U.S. 343 (1980). The Court, however, has required that the State introduce evidence to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979). Also, the Court has required that the state courts not reinterpret a statute retro-
actively so as to deprive an individual of fair notice of the standards set forth in the criminal
law. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
26 S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 48-49. See S. 751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1981).
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forth a proper relationship between the government and the governed. 27
That probable cause is found at a particular point in time and justifies
subsequent temporary incarceration of an individual28 does not alter the
fact that prior to the discovery of probable cause the individual was
entitled to certain liberties vis-A-vis the government.2 9 Thus, I reject the
notion that a right of privacy is forfeited ab initio if it is later discovered
that the individual has engaged in unlawful conduct.30 I see no reason
to distinguish between situations involving an innocent person who is
the subject of an unlawful search and seizure and a person who is later
found guilty through evidence seized in violation of that individual's
constitutional rights. Reasonable minds may differ about the appropri-
27 Cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966):
All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underly-
ing the privilege [against self-incrimination] is the respect a government-state or fed-
eral-must accord to the dignity and integrity of the citizens. To maintain a "fair state-
individual balance," to require the government "to shoulder the entire load,". . . to
respect the inviolability of the human personality, an accusatory system of criminal jus-
tice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of
compelling it from its own mouth.
28 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
29 The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and
Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and re-
straints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people,
their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures
under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or
not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under
our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
30 Professor Schlesinger's argument in behalf of the notion than an individual who is con-
victed of crime should not have a cause of action for invasion of privacy is based upon the
following reasoning:
If criminal activity is predominantly a public concern, then when the police, either
legally or illegally, find evidence of such activity, it is not an invasion of the individual's
privacy to use what the police have found against him in a criminal proceeding. Specifi-
cally, since criminal activity is not private, a location is not private if activities of great
public concern--crimes-are committed or concealed there; thus, the police cannot be
denied access to the location of the crime on the ground of protection of privacy.
S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 48.
This is sheer sophistry. The right of privacy is most assuredly not lost merely because
something of public importance is occurring in what would otherwise be a private location.
One of the best illustrations of this is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which
the Supreme Court held that the right of privacy attached to the use of contraceptives by
married couples, despite a Connecticut statute that purported to prohibit the use of such
contraceptives. If Schlesinger's argument were to prevail, then clearly the majority opinion in
Griswold would have to be overturned, for the activity was criminal under the Connecticut
statute and therefore was a matter of public interest.
In any event, Schlesinger is not totally consistent in his position, because he does ac-.
knowledge that, although an individual who is convicted of a crime does not have an action
against the police, the offending official is still to be disciplined. S. SClHLESINGER, supra note
6, at 71. If the officer is to be disciplined, there must be a reason for it; the only reason that
logically suggests itself is that the officer has been guilty of a violation of someone's constitu-
tional rights.
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ate way to enforce the Bill of Rights,3 1 but this difference of opinion
does not justify differential treatment for the innocent and those later
found guilty of crime. The possibility that an innocent person will sus-
tain greater damages does not mean that a person who is later found
guilty has sustained no damage by reason of his or her being subjected
to an unlawful search and seizure or some other deprivation of rights. : 2
31 Compare, e.g., Gilligan & Lederer, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule with Administratire
Rulemaking, 28 ALA. L. RE%'. 533 (1977), and Boker & Corrigan, Making the Constable Culpable.-
A Proposal to Inprove the Exclusiona9 , Rule, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1291 (1976), with Kamisar, The
Exclusionagy Rule in Historic Perspective. The Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More Than "An
Empty Blessing," 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979), and Canon, Is the Exclusionag
, 
Rule in Failing
Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974).
32 This is one of the reasons for my opposition to S. 751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981),
Amend. No. 93 to S. 951, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and S. 1995, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981), all of which provide in part:
Notwithstanding subsections (b) and (c), the recovery of any person who is convicted of
any offense for which evidence of such offense was seized in violation of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution is limited to actual physical personal in-
jury and to actual property damage sustained as a result of the unconstitutional search
and seizure.
Other objections to the exclusionary rule have been voiced. It has been suggested, for
example, that "the necessity of excluding obviously probative evidence under the rule has
placed increasing pressure on judges to sanction dubious searches and seizures based on dan-
gerously expanded notions of probable cause." S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 63. It may
be, however, that the judges who are tempted to do this are not particularly sympathetic to
the assertion of rights under the Bill of Rights; such judges, even in a non-exclusionary con-
text, might give a rather narrow interpretation to the guarantees provided in the Bill of
Rights.
Another criticism of the rule is that
[the exclusionary rule] which is supposed to discipline and improve police conduct actu-
ally results in encouraging highly pernicious police behavior. The policeman is supposed
to tell the truth, but when he knows that describing the search truthfully will taint the
evidence and free the suspect, the policeman is apt to feel that he has a "higher duty"
than the truth. He may perjure himself to convict the defendant.
Wilkey, The Exclusionag. Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 215, 226 (1978).
If this criticism is taken seriously, then it calls into question any alternative to the exclusion-
ary rule, because presumably any alternative would involve at least some disciplinary proce-
dure directed at the police. See, e.g., S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 72-76. Presumably at
such a disciplinary proceeding, the police officer would have at least as much of an incentive
to lie as such a police officer has now in the context of the administration of the exclusionary
rule; indeed, it can be argued that the police officer would have an even greater motive to
falsify in light of the fact that presumably direct action would be taken against the police
officer. Although police fabrication may be a problem, it is thus not a problem peculiar to
the exclusionary rule.
Another criticism of the rule is that it imposes the same "penalty"-that is, exclusion of
evidence-regardless of the degree of culpability of the officer. See Wilkey, supra, at 226.
Presumably this objection is encompassed within the arguments for a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule. See infra note 35. My proposed statute deals with that problem by
permitting the plaintiff to recover against the government in those situations in which it ap-
pears that a police officer has acted in reasonable good faith.
Still another criticism of the rule is that it makes it "virtually impossible for any state,
not only the federal government, to experiment with any other methods of controlling po-
lice." Id at 227. As Professor Kamisar has pointed out, however, "for many decades the major-
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D. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OMBUDSMAN
The central question, therefore, is whether a criminal procedure
ombudsman can be an effective mechanism for the enforcement of con-
stitutional and other limitations on police practices. In my original pro-
posal, the following means of enforcement were provided: (1)
publication by the ombudsman of a report outlining violations and non-
violations of pertinent rules by the police;:'!' (2) appointment of private
counsel at public expense to sue allegedly offending officials in appropri-
ate courts of law, following a finding of probable cause to believe that
there had been a law violation;3 4 and (3) creation of a cause of action
against an individual police officer in cases where individual responsibil-
ity could be assigned, or against the federal government in those cases
where a law violation had occurred but in which no individual officer
could be held responsible, either because of a lack of proof of identify or
because of the exercise of good faith on the part of the officer.- '5 The
ity of the states had no exclusionary rule but none of them developed any meaningful
alternative. . . This half-century of post-1'eks 'freedom to experiment' did not produce
any meaningful alternative to the exclusionary rule anywhere." Kamisar, supra note 31, at
346.
33 Davidow, supra note 1, at 328, 334. The importance of publicity is illustrated by the
following: "To buttress their own persuasiveness external critics rely heavily on favorable
public opinion. They make annual reports to their creators, usually the national legislators,
and may report additionally when they wish." W. GELLHORN, supra note 2, at 437.
34 See supra note 4.
35 It is already clear, for example, that state law enforcement officials, when sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, can defend on the ground that their arrest was based on probable cause to
believe that the persons arrested had violated a statute subsequently found to be unconstitu-
tional. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The present provision incorporates this stan-
dard. This use of the concept of "good faith" must, of course, be distinguished from the
suggestions that the present exclusionary rule simply be restricted to those instances in which
the police officers acted in the absence of good faith. See United States v. Williams 622 F. 2d
830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); Hearings, supra note 7, at 7-12
(testimony of D. Lowell Jensen). The United States Supreme Court was recently asked to
accept a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, but explicitly refused to do so. Tay-
lor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct. 2664, 2669 (1982).
Although my proposal does not purport to be merely a limitation upon the exclusionary
rule in favor of the policeman who has acted in good faith, some of the discussion regarding
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is pertinent here. Most commentators as-
sume that police action based upon subjective good faith must also be reasonable. The ques-
tion arises whether an action of the police should be regarded as reasonable if the mistake is
based, on the one hand, on a miscalculation of the facts necessary to constitute probable
cause, or, on the other hand, on a failure to anticipate a new constitutional decision by the
United States Supreme Court, a warrant subsequently found invalid, or a precedent later
overruled. In Pierson, the mistake was the latter-a failure to anticipate a later court decision
declaring a statute unconstitutional. At first glance this seems to be a clear instance of the
situation in which the policeman who is being sued ought to be able to rely on what appeared
to be the current law when he or she acted. Some of the difficulties encountered in knowing
whether it is reasonable for a policeman to assume that the present law is valid are illustrated
in Michigan v. Defillipo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). Arguably, the former type of "good faith"
mistake should not exonerate the policeman from personal liability; after all, the notion of
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assumption was that publicity and private law suits against individual
police officers, including police supervisors in cases involving failure to
promulgate or enforce appropriate regulations for the governance of
subordinates, 36 would create pressures at all levels of the police hierar-
chy to adhere to constitutional and other limitations.
One arguable deficiency in this system was the provision for jury
trial, which is required in private suits for damage by the seventh
amendment.3 7 A choice seemingly had to be made between the achieve-
ment of two conflicting goals: (a) to provide for personal liability on the
part of the police officer (to insure compliance with pertinent limita-
tions),38 or (b) to avoid trial by jury because of the possibility-perhaps
probable cause includes the notion of reasonableness, and if the policeman acted reasonably
(apart from situations in which a warrant was required), there was, by definition, no violation
of the Constitution. If a court later decides that the action of the policeman was not reason-
able, there seems little basis for exonerating the policeman. In regard to the warrant situa-
tion, it is so easy to get a warrant that it does not seem unreasonable to require that the
policeman, when in doubt, apply for a warrant. For a general discussion of the "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment.- The
"Reasonable" Exception to the Exc/usionao , Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 635 (1978).
The defense of "good faith" should also be distinguished from proposals to modify the
exclusionary rule by permitting admission of evidence where the violation of the Constitution
was not "substantial." See, e.g., S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., (1981); Coe, TheALISubstantialiy
Test: A Flexible Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction, 10 GA. L. REv. 1 (1975). Although the
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule may involve a measure of subjectivity, such
subjectivity pales in comparison with that contained in the substantiality test. For example,
S. 101 permits the court to consider the following factors in determining whether to admit the
evidence:
(1) The extent to which the violation was reckless; (2) The extent to which privacy was
invaded; (3) The extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent such violations; and, (4)
Whether, but for the violation, the thing seized would have been discovered; or whether
the relation between the things discovered and the violation is attenuated.
36 It is important to set forth explicitly the liability of the superior police officer or
official; particularly it is important to establish affirmatively a requirement that the offi-
cial set forth regulations for the governance of the actions of his subordinates. Although
the Ombudsman might in some instances be concerned with the substance of the regula-
tions (as for example, where they appeared to be unlawful or unconstitutional), the more
important aspect of the problem seems to be the requirement that some kind of rules be
established. After all, as Professor Lon Fuller has struggled mightily to maintain, a legal
system presupposes a set of rules which the lawgiver, as well as the citizen, will obey.
The exercise of unlimited discretion by public officials is the antithesis of a legal system.
I here accept Lon Fuller's assumption that if public officials are required to publicize
their standards and policies, a better system of administration will result. Davidow, supra
note 1, at 338 (footnotes omitted).
37 "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
38 The importance of personal liability on the part of the individual police officer is illus-
trated by Chief Justice Burger's criticism of the exclusionary rule:
The [exclusionary] rule does not apply any direct sanction to the individual official
whose illegal conduct results in the exclusion of evidence in a criminal trial. With rare
exceptions law enforcement agencies do not impose direct sanctions on the individual
officer responsible for a particular judicial application of the Suppression Doctrine.
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probability-that jurors would tend to sympathize unduly with the po-
lice and not with the victims of police lawlessness. : '!' My choice was to
retain private law suits, as opposed to general suits against the govern-
ment, because personal liability is essential to the practical enforcement
of constitutional and other limitations.
In the light of some recent seventh amendment cases, 40 I have come
to the conclusion that the choice outlined above is not a theoretically
necessary one. A choice must be made, however, between a relatively
simple procedural device relying almost exclusively on the ombudsman,
and a considerably more complicated enforcement device involving the
creation of one or more administrative agencies. For the reasons set
forth below I prefer the simpler procedure.
l. Administrative Agencies to Deal With the Problem ofJury Trial
Since it is now clear, if it was not before, that the seventh amend-
ment applies only to suits at common law in the ordinary courts and not
to the enforcement of civil penalties by the government before adminis-
trative agencies, 4' it would be possible to modify the ombudsman propo-
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416
(1971)(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
39 See, e.g., Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers.- Proposals to Srengthen the § 1983 Damage Retnedy
for Law Enforcers Misconduct, 87 YALE LJ. 447 (1978).
40 See infra note 41.
41 In Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 430 U.S.
442 (1977), the Court upheld the action of an administrative agency in seeking abatement of
violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and civil penalties from em-
ployers without a jury trial. The Court said in part:
At least in cases in which "public rights" are being litigated--e.g., cases in which the
Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes
within the power of Congress to enact-the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Con-
gress from assigning the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an administra-
tive forum with which the jury would be incompatible.
Id. at 450 (footnote omitted).
In sum, the cases discussed above stand clearly for the proposition that when Con-
gress creates new statutory "public rights," it may assign their adjudication to an admin-
istrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the
Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be "preserved" in "suits at common
law." Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to choke the already
crowded federal courts with new types of litigation or prevented from committing some
new types of litigation to administrative agencies with special competence in the relevant
field. This is the case even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where
the adjudication of those rights is assigned to a federal court of law instead of an admin-
istrative agency.
Id. at 455 (footnote omitted).
There seems little doubt that actions by the federal government to enforce constitutional
restraints upon law enforcement officials would constitute the litigation of "public rights," as
that phrase is used in Atlas Roofing. It may be argued that this approach by the Supreme
Court exalts form over substance in that the forum seems to be the determinative factor,
rather than the nature of the action itself. If so, this is hardly the only instance in which the
court has exalted form over substance. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
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sal. In addition to creating the office of ombudsman, one could create
two administrative agencies: (a) a procedural enforcement commis-
sion-an independent agency that would seek civil penalties against of-
fending policemen (under the standards set forth under the original
proposal), with adjudication before administrative law judges appointed
in the usual manner42-- and (b) a victims' compensation commission-
an independent agency to which both victims of crime and victims of
police lawlessness could go for compensation from the government. 43
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of the New and Old Proposals
The main advantage of the more recent proposal to provide for the
creation of two administrative agencies is the avoidance of trial by jury
in the case of suits against individual police officers. There are at least
two disadvantages. First, and perhaps more obviously, a procedure of
considerable complexity would be created. One can certainly argue
that today we have enough complexity as it is without adding to it.
Moreover, there would be additional costs involving two new agencies.
Additionally, the present political climate does not favor the creation of
new bureaucracies. 44
The second disadvantage of the more recent proposal relates to the
method of appointment of the heads of the agencies. Under Buckley v.
Valeo, 45 the heads of agencies would unquestionably be officers whose
appointments would be governed by the appointments clause.46 Possi-
(1977) (defendant could be required to prove absence of mitigating circumstance in homocide
prosecution because absence of mitigating circumstance was not explicitly made an element
of the offense, even though a contrary result had previously been reached in regard to the
common law offense of murder because it was assumed that at common law the definition of
murder included the notion of an absence of provocation).
42 Hearings before such administrative law judges would be preferable to the administra-
tive remedies suggested by Schlesinger, who proposed the creation of an independent review
board to discipline offending police officers. Professor Schlesinger suggested that the board
consist of "citizens, judges, law officers and any other groups whose representation may be
desirable." S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6 at 73. I see no reason to have police officers sit on a
board to review the action of other police officers. If we analogize this situation to ajury trial,
one can be reasonably certain that counsel opposing the police officer would exercise preemp-
tory challenges so as to insure the absence from the jury of any member of a law enforcement
agency. A police officer should be no better off before an independent review board than
before a jury in regard to the makeup of the fact-finding body.
43 Giving the same commission power to compensate victims of crime as well as victims of
police lawlessness might increase the political acceptability of such a scheme, in light of pres-
ent proposals to create agencies to compensate victims of crime. For a discussion of victim
compensation schemes, see, e.g., McGee, Crime Victim Compensation, 5 J. CO NTEMP. L. 67
(1978).
44 See Omnibus Budget Reconcilation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
45 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
46 [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court
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bly these officers could be appointed only by the President. 47 The Presi-
dent, however, might appoint someone who was not particularly
sympathetic to the enforcement of constitutional rights against the po-
lice.48 If this were done, it seems unlikely that the creation of such agen-
cies, even with the additional creation of an ombudsman, could be an
adequate substitute for the exclusionary rule. On the other hand, if en-
forcement were almost exclusively within the hands of the ombudsman,
this individual might be appointed in a manner different from that spec-
ified in the appointments clause. In my original proposal, I suggested
that the ombudsman "be selected by the President of the United States
from a list of three nominees submitted by a committee composed of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, the House Minority Leader, and the Senate Minority
Leader."'49  My assumption was that such a bi-partisan committee
would have to reach some sort of compromise agreement in order to
make any recommendation to the President, and that at least two mem-
bers of the committee would insist upon the appointment of someone
who was at least not hostile to the enforcement of the Bill of Rights.5 0
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court held that members of the
Federal Election Commission were officers of the United States whose appointment was con-
trolled by the appointments clause. The Court said in part:
Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be
appointed in accordance with the Clause. Principal officers are selected by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Inferior officers Congress may allow to be
appointed by the President alone, by the Heads of Departments, or by the Judiciary. No
class or type of officer is excluded because of its special functions.
Id. at 132.
47 See Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 920 (D.D.C. 1967)(Wright, Cir. J.,
dissenting).
48 If the appointments to the federal bench can be taken as an indication of the likely
approach to the appointment of an ombudsman by the President, then one has reason to fear
that the President would appoint someone with views fairly similar to his or her own. If the
President happened to be unsympathetic to the enforcement of the Bill of Rights, then, of
course, the difficulty mentioned in the text would be realized. For documentation of the
principle that Presidents have tended to appoint those from their own party (and hence those
who presumably have similar views) see, e.g., L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, THE UNITED
STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CAN-
DIDATES 134 (1980).
49 Davidow, supra note 1, at 327.
50 Compromise is required because each party has, in effect, a veto power over the choices
of the other party. Cf Davidow,Judizal Selection: The Searchfor Quality and Representativeness,
31 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 409, 440-41 (1981) (application of the principle of enforced com-
poimise through the exercise of the veto power in the context of the work of a judicial nomi-
nating commission).
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Because the ombudsman could not be an effective substitute for the ex-
clusionary rule if the President were totally free to select the
ombudsman, I would prefer to adhere to my original proposal for
appointment.
The question remains, however, whether such a method of selection
is consistent with the constitutional requirement-more specifically,
whether selection of the ombudsman would be covered by the appoint-
ments clause. (The originally proposed method of selection, binding the
President to select from among a list of three persons submitted to him
or her, seems clearly inconsistent with the appointments clause.) The
question certainly is not free from doubt. A strong argument can be
made, however, that the ombudsman would not be subject to the ap-
pointments clause, and that Buckl can be distinguished on its facts.
One could argue that the powers of the election commission in Buckley
were considerably broader than, and very different from, the powers en-
trusted to the ombudsman. 51 In fact, the only power of the ombudsman
beyond that of merely investigating and reporting52 would be the power
to appoint counsel at government expense when the ombudsman found
probable cause to believe that an aggrieved person had been the victim
of a law violation. 53 Alternatively, the court might be persuaded that
the ombudsman as an institution was so different from the traditional
three branches of government that the appointments clause ought not to
apply.54 The ombudsman arguably would be like a fourth branch of
government, totally different from anything contemplated by the fram-
ers at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.
51 The federal election commission was given "extensive rulemaking and adjudicative
powers." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 110 (1976).
52 "Insofar as the powers confided in the Commission are essentially of an investigative
and informative nature, falling in the same general category as those powers which Congress
might delegate to one of its own committees, there can be no question that the Commission as
presently constituted may exercise them." Id. at 137.
53 Davidow, supra note 1, at 328.
54 The founding fathers undoubtedly assumed that all powers could be categorized as
either legislative, executive, or judicial:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elec-
tive, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitu-
tion, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of
powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments
would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself,
however, that it will be made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be sup-
ported, and that the maxim upon which it relies has been totally misconceived and
misapplied.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, 313 (J. Madison)(Bicentennial ed. 1976). Since the ombudsman,
under my original proposal, would have no real power at all, except the power to speak and
to provide for the payment of private counsel at government expense under certain circum-
stances, it can be argued plausibly that the appointments clause, which supposes a tri-partite
form of government, ought not to apply to the appointment of such an ombudsman.
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III. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL
The prior discussion indicates that I would adhere to most of the
original proposal.55 In several areas, however, departures from the origi-
nal plan seem necessary or desirable. For example, a desire to keep the
appointment power out of the hands of the President, along with contin-
ued doubts about the constitutionality of my original proposal, has led
me to propose a totally different method of selection, as set forth below.
A. METHOD OF SELECTION
I have already alluded both to the constitutional problems associ-
ated with the original plan for selection of the ombudsman, and to the
undesirability of permitting the President to select the ombudsman. 6
My solution to this dilemma is to provide for appointment of the
ombudsman by the United States Supreme Court, acting unani-
mously.57 For example, a requirement of unanimity would prevent the
appointment of someone totally unsympathetic to the enforcement of
the Bill of Rights; presumably, at least some members of the Court
would be relatively sympathetic to the enforcement of such provisions
and could hold out for the appointment of someone with similar atti-
tudes.58 Given the limited power of the ombudsman, it seems likely that
the ombudsman could be regarded as "an inferior officer," and as such
the ombudsman probably could be appointed by "the courts of law." 59
55 See supra notes 33-54, and accompanying text.
56 See supra notes 45-54, and accompanying text.
57 See supra note 46.
58 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
59 See supra note 46.
Finally, it is objected that the Act of Congress imposes upon the circuit court duties not
judicial, in requiring them to appoint the supervisors of election, whose duties, it is al-
leged, are entirely executive in their character. It is contended that no power can be
conferred upon the Courts of the United States to appoint officers whose duties are not
connected with the judicial department of the government.
The Constitution declares that "The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or
in the heads of departments." It is, no doubt, usual and proper to vest the appointment
of inferior officers in that department of the government, executive or judicial, or in that
particular executive department to which the duties of such officer appertain. But there
is no absolute requirement to this effect in the Constitution; and, if there were, it would
be difficult in many cases to determine to which department an office properly belonged.
Take that of Marshal, for instance. He is an executive officer, whose appointment, in
ordinary cases, is left to the President and Senate. But if Congress should, as it might,
vest the appointment elsewhere, it would be questionable whether it should be in the
President alone, in the Department of Justice, or in the courts. The Marshal is pre-
eminently the officer of the courts; and, in case of a vacancy, Congress has in fact passed
a law bestowing the temporary appointment of the Marshal upon the justice of the cir-
cuit in which the district in which the vacancy occurs is situated.
But as the Constitution stands, the selection of the appointing power, as between the
functionaries named, is a matter resting in the discretion of Congress. And, looking at
the subject in a practical light, it is, perhaps, better that it should rest there, than that the
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The appointment of someone not hostile to the enforcement of the Bill
of Rights is so crucial to the effectuation of this proposed alternative to
the exclusionary rule that I would expressly provide that if the appoint-
ment section of the proposal were held invalid by the court, the whole
statute would be inoperative and the exclusionary rule would be
restored.
B. LIMITATION OF JURISDICTION
My original proposal called for the creation of a national
ombudsman who would enforce lawful behavior on the part of all law
enforcement personnel, state and federal.15 I argued that Congress
could do this in regard to state officials through its power to enforce the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."1 Arguably, this ap-
proach remains sound. If Congress is serious about doing something
about the problems of crime and the problems associated with the exclu-
sionary rule, it will do little good to restrict itself to federal law enforce-
ment, since federal law enforcement is only a small part of the total law
enforcement picture today.6- It is also true that Congress, despite some
public protestations to the contrary, has continued to intrude into state
affairs, as demonstrated by congressional efforts to promote family val-
ues and to spend federal monies to accomplish this goal.653
Upon reflection, however, I believe that today's political climate
country should be harrassed by the endless controversies to which a more specific direc-
tion on this subject might have given rise.
Expare Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1880).
60 Davidow, supra note 1, at 327, 328, 329, 333.
61 Id. at 333.
62 The common assumption that the states prosecute the vast majority of criminal cases in
the United States is illustrated by the fact that -[t]he Uniform Crime Reports give a nation-
wide view of crime based on police statistics contributed by state and local law enforcement
agencies." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REI'ORTS v (1980). When the
Uniform Crime Reports were begun approximately fifty years ago, only state and local au-
thorities were used as a source of information, apparently because of this assumption about
the low number of federal criminal prosecutions in relation to the number of state prosecu-
tions. This assumption apparently still continues to operate. Phone conversation between
Robert P. Davidow and John McBreen, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C.,
January 22, 1982. Although another document does report that in 1978, 972,000 criminal
cases were prosecuted in the federal court, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 415 (1980), there is no comparable figure for state courts;
therefore, it is impossible to compare accurately the number of state and federal prosecutions.
Phone conversation between Robert P. Davidow and Anthony Cain, Court Specialist, Na-
tional Criminal Justice Reference Service, January 22, 1982. The editors of a popular
casebook on criminal procedure recently reported that yearly federal felony prosecutions rep-
resent "less than 5% of all felony prosecutions initiated annually within the United States."
Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 2 (5th ed. 1980).
They cited no authority to support this proposition, however.
63 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 955(a), 95 Stat.
357, 578 (1981).
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makes it pointless to propose that Congress act to enforce the Bill of
Rights against state authority. Thus, my proposal here is to restrict the
ombudsman to the enforcement of constitutional and other legal rights
against the federal government. Possibly the federal example will en-
courage states to adopt similar, effective procedures for the enforcement
of the Bill of Rights and other appropriate limitations upon police
activity.64
C. MITIGATION OF LACK OF JURY SYMPATHY TOWARD PLAINTIFF
The original proposal provided for a jury trial pursuant to the sev-
enth amendment when an aggrieved person sued an allegedly offending
public official or officials. Borrowing from a recent proposal to amend
42 U.S.C. § 1983,65 1 now propose that the federal government, presum-
ably through the Justice Department, be given authority to join as a
party plaintiff. Such joinder would lessen the disparity in the degree to
which each side might elicit sympathy. Without such a joinder, the jury
would be likely to sympathize more with the law enforcement official
than with the plaintiff, since the latter might have a prior criminal rec-
ord and be guilty of an offense that was the subject of the defendant's
unlawful investigation. 66
D. METHOD OF COMPENSATION
Inflationary trends require a change in regard to compensation.
The original proposal was that actual damages, but not less than fifty
dollars, be recoverable for every instance of law violation. 67 There was
also a provision for exemplary damages. The provision for a minimum
recovery of fifty dollars is obviously inadequate today.68 To obviate the
need for Congress to amend the statute on a yearly basis, it seems to
make more sense to tie the mimimum amount recoverable to some-more
general standard. For example, minimum amounts that are recovered
under the statute might be one and one-half percent of the annual gross
income of someone earning the minimum wage for adults. 69
64 Cf Davidow, OneJustice For All: A Proposal to Establish, by Federal Constitutional Amendment,
a National System of CrininalJustice, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 259, 275 (1972) (use of law in the District
of Columbia as a basis for experimentation to determine whether the law ought to be made
applicable across the country).
65 Newman, supra note 39, at 453-54.
66 Id.
67 Davidow, supra note 1, at 329, 338.
68 The following minimum damages have recently been proposed: "Any deprivation of a
constitutional right should be valued at not less than one thousand dollars; any time wrong-
fully spent in jail, no matter how brief, should be valued at not less than two thousand five
hundred dollars." Newman, supra note 39, at 465.
69 If we assume that a person works 50 weeks and 40 hours per week at the present mini-
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My original assumption was that there ought to be some minimum
amount that should be recoverable in every instance of "law violation"
as defined in the original proposal. I continue to adhere to this proposi-
tion. Although an aggrieved person may not be able to show much in
the way of actual damages, it is important that the victim, and society as
a whole, be able to perceive that something is being done to remedy the
situation. 70 This "something" must take the form of more than nominal
damages.
IV. CONCLUSION
The exclusionary rule has been rather like the weather: many peo-
ple continue to talk about it, but the state and federal legislatures have
persisted in doing nothing about it. The bills that have occasionally
been introduced in Congress have attempted either to modify the rule7'
or to abolish it altogether while providing an "alternative" that is totally
inadequate. 72 The challenge is to adopt a remedy that will be efective in
ensuring that law enforcement officials obey the Constitution and other
mum wage of $3.35 an hour, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (1978), we find that the minimum
amount recoverable would be $100.50. Although this may seem like a small amount, it must
be remembered that this is the minimum amount that may be recovered. One must also
consider that under the proposal the attorney would be provided at government expense; the
$100.50 is not subject to any deduction for attorney fees. It would obviously be possible to
increase the percentage of the minimum wage if it were thought desirable to do so.
70 "Basic to libertarian jurisprudence is acceptance of the reality that public sentiment is a
factor to be considered." Gottlieb, Feedback From the Fourth Amendment.- Is the Exclusionary Rule
an Albatross Around the Judicial Neck?, 67 Ky. LJ. 1008, 1017 (1978-79). Consider also the
importance in the mind of the late Lon Fuller of the reciprocal relationship between the
government and the governed. See L. FULLER, supra note 4.
71 See, e.g., S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 951 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1995,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). S. 101 provides no substitute for the exclusionary rule; the other
two bills provide substitutes, the deficiencies of which are discussed infra, note 72.
72 See, e.g., S. 751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Among the deficiencies of the bill, which
would create a tort remedy against the United States, are the following: (1) It relates only to
the fourth amendment. (2) It provides no liability on the part of the individual law enforce-
ment official. (3) One convicted of an offense relating to the evidence unlawfully seized may
not recover unless that person suffers actual physical personal injury or actual property dam-
age. (4) There is an absolute limitation on liability; the maximum recoverable is twenty-five
thousand dollars. (5) Although there is a provision for disciplining the law enforcement of-
ficer, the agency that employs the officer is responsible for such discipline. (6) Private counsel
is not appointed in the first instance; there is a provision for the recovery of actual costs on the
part of a successful claimant, but this apparently is discretionary.
Similar deficiencies exist in Amend. No. 93 to S. 951, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The
main difference between S. 751 and this amendment to S. 951 appears to be that the latter
provides for the creation of a "Search and Seizure Review Board," which is to determine
whether a violation of the fourth amendment was conducted in good faith. (As is true of S.
751, the language is "good faith," rather than "reasonable good faith.") If the Board finds an
absence of good faith, the Board is to recommend "appropriate disciplinary procedures to the
agency which shall discipline the officer" (emphasis added).
S. 1995, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) provides a tort remedy that suffers from the first four
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appropriate limitations upon their authority. Thus, given a choice be-
tween adhering to the present exclusionary rule and abandoning the
rule with no effective alternative, I would unhesitatingly choose to re-
tain the exclusionary rule.
As others have pointed out, a reason for some of the opposition to
the exclusionary rule and to an effective substitute for the exclusionary
rule may really be an opposition to the substantive rules enunciated by
the Supreme Court in interpreting the fourth amendment. 73 Thus, the
underlying problem may be a broad one: a fundamental disagreement
about the way in which the government should relate to the governed.74
Some of the opposition to the enforcement of the Bill of Rights may
come from a perception that society is divided into two groups-the
law-abiding persons and the criminals-and that the object of law en-
forcement is to wage war upon the latter.75 Procedural niceties are seen
as irrelevant to the prosecution of such a war. The morale of the citi-
zenry is said to suffer if the goal is not total victory. Obviously there is
another view of society. For example, the late Lon Fuller emphasized
the reciprocal relationship between law-giver and law-receiver, main-
taining that law is "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules."'76 In this enterprise, the law-receivers must be con-
vinced that the system is a good one so that they will have an incentive
to obey the laws. If they are to feel that the system is a good one, they
must be assured that the law-givers will adhere to the law that has been
devised to govern the relationship between the government and the peo-
ple. One can argue that from this perspective the long-range goal of the
criminal law ought to be to bring those who have been criminally con-
victed back into the enterprise.77 Total warfare, without adherence to
deficiencies mentioned supra in connection with S. 751. Unlike S. 751 and S. 951, however, S.
1995 contains no provision for disciplining law enforcement officers.
For discussion of other bills that have been recently introduced in the Congress, see Gel-
ler, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Eclusionagy Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q.
621, 704-09 (1975).
73 See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 31, at 343.
74 Thus the chief difficulty involved in an attempt to apply the ombudsman principle
to the problem of police lawlessness in the United States today becomes clear: Some
police administrators apparently do not share some of the values expressed in the Bill of
Rights of the Federal Constitution. In this they seem to have the support of a substantial
portion of the population.
Davidow, supra note 1, at 324 (footnote omitted).
75 f Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204 THE NATION 596 (1967) ("Policeman see them-
selves as fighting a two-front war-against criminals in the street and against 'liberal' rules of
law in court. All's fair in this war, including the use of perjury to subvert 'liberal' rules of law
that might free those who 'ought' to be jailed.")
76 L. FULLER, supra note 4, at 96.
77 As to the stigmatization associated with criminal conviction, the real problem may
not be the initial stigma but rather the continuing effects of that conviction. In this
regard, a partial solution would seem to be the repeal of those laws that deprive con-
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fundamental rules, is hardly calculated to inspire such individuals to
participate in the enterprise. I am not suggesting that we "coddle"
criminals or that the notion of deterrence has no validity.78 What I am
alluding to is the obvious fact that eventually most of the persons who
enter prison will return to society. The question, therfore, is whether
upon their return they are going to feel a sufficient commitment to the
system to obey its rules.
79
It is possible, of course, to take the position that these different per-
spectives are simply two competing viewsS°-two different definitions of
the situation8 1-and that there is no empirical way to demonstrate that
one rather than the other perception is "correct." Under these circum-
stances, we may be forced to resort to history, for at least the history of
the ratification of the Constitution and, more specifically, the Bill of
victed felons of many of their constitutional rights even after they have "paid their debt
to society." Perpetual disenfranchisement of ex-felons is an example of such a law.
Again, the analogy of the treatment of children may be appropriate. A young child may
be "punished" for having disobeyed his parents. Punishment may take the form of a
lecture and perhaps even a spanking. The child, however, is not perpetually ostracized,
but is made to see that although a wrong has been committed, he is still loved by, and a
part of, the family. Similarly society could emphasize individual responsibility through
stigmatization associated with criminal conviction while at the same time providing min-
imum deprivation of physical liberty and constitutional rights. Of course, to be fully
effective such a scheme would also require a generally more forgiving societal attitude.
Davidow, Book Review, 52 TEX. L. REv. 1245, 1252 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
78 Unquestionably, given the right circumstances, people can be deterred. For example,
while serving in Korea in the United States Army in the 1960s, I was told of how a Turkish
unit in Korea solved the problem of thefts by members of the local population. Members of
the Turkish unit caught a person attempting to steal items from their compound and the
following day suspended the thief, by a spike driven through the thief's head, from the fence
in front of the main gate of the compound. Thereafter, the Turkish unit was no longer both-
ered with the problem of theft, although other United Nations units in the area continued to
be the objects of thievery. Obviously, the situation becomes considerably more complex when
notions of due process come into play. For discussion of the concept of deterrence in the
context of capital punishment, see, e.g., Baldos & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten
Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Efect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975).
79 Clearly other factors may influence the decision of an ex-convict to adhere to the law,
on the one hand, or to return to a life of crime, on the other hand. The availability of em-
ployment upon release from prison is an example. In a recent speech, Chief Justice Burger,
for instance, acknowledged the importance of this factor. See Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1981,
at A12, col. 1.
80 That there are differing views is hardly surprising in light of the well recognized phe-
nomenon of selective perception. See Hastorf & Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 129, 133 (1954); Vidmar & Rokeach, Archie Bunker's Bigot : A
Study in Selective Perception and Exposure, 24 J. COM. 36 (1974).
81 The concept of the "definition of the situation" was apparently developed by W.I.
Thomas, and is discussed in R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 475-77
(enlarged ed. 1968). The significance of this phrase for sociology is not only that it is a
description of an individual's perception, but also that it often describes a false perception
that constitutes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Merton refers to the example of a solvent bank in
1932 that became insolvent as a result of a perception on the part of depositors that it was not
solvent. (This perception caused them to withdraw their funds from the bank, and this with-
drawal resulted in insolvency.) Id at 476.
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Rights tells us something about the attitudes of the framers of the Con-
stitution. We do know that they were opposed to the exercise of unfet-
tered power of the sort that characterized the actions of police before the
adoption of the exclusionary rule.82 Part of the difficulty may be that in
this country we have not done a very good job of educating the general
public in regard to the principles that underlie our system of govern-
ment.83 One of the more attractive features of the criminal procedure
ombudsman is that the ombudsman, through the power to investigate
and report, can probably educate the public more effectively than can
any other body.8 4 One should recall that an ombudsman is not an ad-
vocate for one side or the other, but is an independent government offi-
cial whose duties include pointing out the successes as well as failures of
government officials.8 5  Given this position of impartiality, the
ombudsman is in a better position than is a defense counsel or a member
82 The Writ of Assistance was used by the British during the colonial period; such usage
formed part of the background surrounding the ratification of the fourth amendment provi-
sion against unreasonable searches and seizures, which was first proposed in 1789. See 1 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 6, at 4-5. More specifically, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which
was adopted by Virginia in 1776 and apparently served as a model for parts of the Bill of
Rights, provided in Clause 10:
That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to search
suspected places without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or per-
sons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evi-
dence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
Virginia Declaration of Rights § 10, reprinted in GEORGE MASON LECTURES 20 (1976).
83 Most people do not understand freedom of speech as a generalizeable principle; in
failing to apply it in concrete situations, in tolerating restrictions on civil liberties, most
people are revealing a failure of understanding rather than an attitude of hostility to civil
liberties in general or to free speech in particular.
Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Sunr, Evidence, 11 L. & Soc'" REv. 427,
445 (1977). Another study showing antipathy toward, and hence a possible misunderstanding
of, some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, is J. CASPER, Tim POLITICS OF CIVIL LIBER-
TIES 1-2, 223-24 (1972).
84 See supra note 33.
85 Maybe those of us who like Ombudsmenship have been a bit careless in presenting it
as though we thought that the citizen-the customer, so to speak-is always right. Per-
haps we have implied that the Ombudsman is always going to side with the citizen
against officials. Of course, that isn't the way things have worked out in any degree.
Wherever an Ombudsman has functioned, he has been purely and plainly an advocate
of sound administration, not an advocate of the position of the complainant. In this
respect, he has differed from many legislators who tend, when a constituent complains, to
become an advocate of the complainant's case without much consideration of its merit;
they pushed the matter because of the source from which it comes, not because of its
worth. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not a built-in critic of officials, whether
elected or not. He is simply stationed at the margin, as it were, between the citizen and
the official, and he must be concerned with seeing that justice is done to public servants
as well as to the public whom they serve. Believe me, he does protect both groups. I
have not the slightest doubt that if a free vote were taken among the police and other
officials in any country in which the Ombudsman has functioned, a truly overwhelming
majority of the participants in the election would favor the continuation of
Ombudsmanship.




of the American Civil Liberties Union, for example, to explain to the
public the rationale for the various limitations on governmental author-
ity in the field of criminal procedure. As a "doer," the ombudsman is
also more likely than is the academic critic to have success in educating
the public, since many Americans seem to be suspicious of academi-
cians. This greater ability to inform and educate is an important reason
for preferring the ombudsman to other proposed substitutes for the ex-
clusionary rule.86
The exclusionary rule is not an end in itself. It will lose its raison d'
Ntre if an effective alternative can be found. The criminal procedure
ombudsman is such an alternative.
APPENDIX
THE PROPOSED ACT OF CONGRESS*
A BILL
To create a criminal procedure ombudsman and to abrogate the
exclusionary rule, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America, in Congress assembled That this Act may be cited as the
"Criminal Procedure Ombudsman Act of 198."
SEC. 2. It is the sense of Congress, that since the exclusionary rule
of criminal procedure (whereby trustworthy evidence seized in violation
of the fourth, fifth, and sixth [,and fourteenth] amendments to the
United States Constitution has been inadmissible in [both state and]
federal criminal trials) has failed to protect the innocent, has sometimes
permitted guilty persons to escape punishment, and generally has failed
to deter some police lawlessness, these evils ought to be reduced as far as
practicable (and within constitutional limitations) primarily through
the creation of a criminal procedure ombudsman, and secondarily
through the abrogation of the exclusionary rule.
SEC. 3. As used in this statute, the following words or phrases
have the following meanings:
(a) Law violation means any violation of the federal Constitution,
[state constitutions,] federal laws, [state laws, local ordinances,] and reg-
ulations of any federal administrative body [(local, state, or federal, and
including the police)], including federal law enforcement agencies.
(b) Ombudsman means the Ombudsman if spelled with a capital
86 See, e.g., S. SCHLESINGER, suira note 6, at 71-82.
* The original, 1983 proposal appears in regular roman type. The deletions and
additions proposed in the present Article appear in brackets and bold face type, respectively.
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"0"; if spelled with a lower case "o," it refers to both the Ombudsman
and assistant ombudsmen.
(c) Public ojiial means any official or employee of the federal gov-
ernment, [the states, or any political subdivision of the states,] but does
not include state and federal judges or federal magistrates.
SEC. 4. The Congress of the United States hereby establishes a
Criminal Procedure Ombudsman (hereafter referred to as the
Ombudsman).
SEC. 5. The Ombudsman shall be selected by the [President of the
United States from a list of three nominees submitted by a committee
composed of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President
Pro Tempore of the Senate, the House Minority Leader, and the Senate
Minority Leader] unanimous vote of the justices of the United States
Supreme Court.
Sec. 6. The Ombudsman shall serve a term of fifteen years unless:
(a) on the fifth or tenth anniversary of his or her selection, the [Congress,
by majority vote of the total membership of each House thereof] United
States Supreme Court by unanimous vote, shall remove him or her, or
(b) at any time the [Congress, by a two-thirds vote of the total member-
ship of each House] Supreme Court, by a two-thirds vote, shall remove
him or her because of disability or conviction of a felony or other crime
involving moral turpitude.
SEC. 7. No person shall serve as Ombudsman unless he or she has
reached his or her thirty-fifth birthday, has been admitted to the prac-
tice of law in at least one state or the District of Columbia, and has not
been involved in partisan affairs for five years immediately preceding his
selection.
SEC. 8. The salary of the Ombudsman shall equal that of the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
SEC. 9. The Ombudsman shall have the power:
(a) to receive complaints, oral or written, from anyone regarding
the actions of public officials relating to any type of detention (regard-
less of duration and regardless of whether it occurs in connection with
criminal or civil commitment proceedings), interrogation, interference
with the attorney-client relationship, searches, or other invasions of
privacy;
(b) to investigate the complaints referred to in (a) or, on his or her
own initiative, to investigate the matters described in (a);
(c) in the course of investigations referred to in (b), to have access
to the internal files of any public official, to take the depositions of perti-
nent witnesses, whose presence may be compelled by subpoena issued by
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the ombudsman (and enforceable in an appropriate federal district
court), and to inspect the premises of public officials whose activities he
may investigate;
(d) with respect to the matters described in (a), to make and pub-
licize recommendations concerning that which the Ombudsman deems
either (1) necessary to the avoidance of law violations, or (2) desirable,
from a policy standpoint; however, publication shall occur only after
any public officials whose actions are to be criticized are given an oppor-
tunity to respond to the criticisms, and the publication shall include the
criticized officials' responses;
(e) to authorize payment of private counsel from appropriated
funds for litigation, when the Ombudsman determines that there is
probable cause to believe that an aggrieved person has a cause of action
as described in section 12 of this statute;
(f) to appoint private counsel at government expense to sue in an
appropriate federal district court for a declaratory judgment in those
instances in which the Ombudsman decides that there is a need to deter-
mine whether there has been a law violation with respect to the matters
described in subsection (a) and in which such determination has not
been and is not likely to be made through litigation referred to in sub-
section (e);
(g) to appoint not more than [1001 twelve assistant ombudsmen
who shall:
(1) have all of the qualifications of the Ombudsman.
(2) be paid the same salary as that received by judges of the
United States District Courts;
(3) exercise any of the powers of the Ombudsman which the
Ombudsman, in his or her discretion, delegates to them (except that of
delegation), and
(4) serve for a term of fifteen years unless removed by [Congress]
the United States Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of
section 6; and
(h) to appoint such other staff members as may be necessary to
effectuate this act.
SEC. 10. The Ombudsman may refuse to investigate a complaint
if, on its face, it is obviously unmeritorious, or may require that a claim-
ant of an apparently meritorious claim exhaust available administrative
remedies, unless there is a danger of unreasonable delay or undue hard-
ship. Following investigation of a facially meritorious claim, the
Ombudsman may proceed no further if the facts found by him demon-
strate that the claim is unmeritorious. The Ombudsman shall advise the
claimant and the public official who is the object of the complaint of
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any action taken; the Ombudsman shall also advise the complainant of
a decision to proceed no further and the reasons therefor.
SEC. 11. Subject to the limitations of section 9(d), the
Ombudsman shall report annually to Congress regarding the work of his
or her office.
SEc. 12. (a) Any person who is aggrieved because of a law viola-
tion by a public official may sue the offending official or officials (in-
cluding a supervisory official where the supervisory official has
materially contributed to the violation through willful misconduct or
through negligence, including the failure to make or enforce reasonable
regulations for the governance of the conduct of those working under
him or her) in an appropriate United States District Court. Compensa-
tory damages (not less than [$50 for each violation] 1.5% of the annual
gross income of someone working fifty weeks and earning the minimum
wage, for each offense), exemplary damages (in cases of willful miscon-
duct, and costs may be recovered by the aggrieved person.
(b) In suits authorized under (a), if the fact-finder (judge or jury)
rules in favor of the defendant, the fact-finder shall render a special ver-
dict in which it shall indicate whether the basis of the verdict was (1) the
absence of a law violation, (2) the inability of the fact finder to attribute
blame to a specific defendant (despite a law violation), or (3) a reason-
able, good faith effort on the part of the defendant to avoid a law
violation.
(c) When the fact-finder renders judgment for the defendant for
reasons (2) or (3) set forth in subsection (b), the trial court shall render
judgment against the United States for an amount determined accord-
ing to the principles set forth in subsection (a).
(d) In suits under this section, the United States may [intervene]
join as a party [defendant] plaintiff.
(e) No judgment against an individual official under this section
shall be satisfied, directly or indirectly, with public funds (local, state, or
federal), nor shall such judgment be satisfied, directly or indirectly,
through a system of individual or group insurance.
SEC. 13. No letter addressed to the ombudsman from any person
whose mail might otherwise be subject to censorship shall be opened
prior to delivery to the ombudsman.
SEc. 14. The Ombudsman shall have authority to seek injunctive
relief in an appropriate federal district court against efforts by individu-
als to obstruct the activities of the ombudsman or his or her staff.
SEC. 15. No activities of the ombudsman and staff with respect to
the functions of the ombudsman shall be reviewed in any court.
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SEC. 16. The ombudsman shall enjoy the same immunities from
civil and criminal liability as are enjoyed by federal judges.
SEC. 17. No evidence obtained through a law violation shall be
inadmissible in any federal court if that evidence is trustworthy and is
obtained subsequent to three years after the effective date of this statute;
however, this section shall be inoperative if section 5 is declared invalid
by the courts.
SEC. 18. It shall be the duty of every attorney involved in [the
trial (state or federal)] a federal trial of any case dealing with alleged
criminal acts, civil commitment, or prison administration to report to
the ombudsman every instance of apparent law violation by public
officials.
SEC. 19. [If section 17 is declared unconstitutional] If that portion
of section 17 that abrogates the exlusionary rule is declared unconstitu-
tional, the remainder of this act shall remain in effect, it being the sense
of Congress that, even without formal abolition of the exclusionary rule,
the ombudsman may reduce the need for the employment of the exclu-
sionary rule.
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